By Lawrence I. Charters
Washington State University History Symposium, Spring 1975.
Liut’iaokou to Hiroshoma
On September 18, 1931, shortly before midnight, an explosion destroyed thirty-one inches of track belonging to the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway. Liut’iaokou station, the scene of the incident, soon became engulfed in fighting as Japanese troops of the Kwantung Army attacked and overwhelmed local Chinese forces responsible (in Japanese eyes) for the blast. By early morning the fighting had spread from Liut’iaokou to Mukden, and within a few days a general Japanese occupation of all Manchuria was in progress.1
Japanese officials on the scene viewed the occupation as a logical, and necessary, measure to insure the effective and peaceful preservation of their national interests. Such a view, however, was not universally held, and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State for the United States at the time of the incident, claimed in 1948 that “the road to World War II is now clearly visible; it has run its terrible course from the railway tracks near Mukden to the operations of two bombers over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”2 Though Stimson, in grand fashion, overstated his case, he expressed an important and strong sentiment: the Manchurian Incident, far from being an act aimed at peaceful control, was a violent precedent for international disorder and destruction.
Response to this precedent, obviously, was not of such an order as to limit or reverse the actions of September 18. The major diplomatic undertaking of the period, Stimson’s Nonrecognition note of January 7, 1932, was little more than an American denial of support for Japanese actions.3 No positive effort was suggested or implied, and the note, intended as a stern rebuff, was for the most part ignored. British and French diplomats privately agreed that Stimson’s note could well cause more harm than good,4 and, publicly, Great Britain declined an American invitation to support this venture.5 A London Times editorial of January 11, 1932, went so far as to suggest that Stimson’s action may well have been influenced more by the upcoming presidential election than by international tensions.6
If the Manchurian Incident was such an important step on the path to global war, there naturally arises the question of why nothing stronger than the rather inane Stimson note was offered to halt this horrible trend. Whereas most works have attempted to answer this question by focusing upon the League of Nations, the United States, or Japan, this study will concern itself with the activities of Great Britain.7 In particular, this study will center itself around the first two months of the crisis (before the Japanese occupation was consolidated), and seek to discover what the British perceptions of the conflict were, and how these perceptions influenced the search for possible solutions.
Annus Terribilis8
Before any attempt can be made at understanding British foreign policy during this period, it is necessary to examine the general international climate of 1931. In Europe, the collapse of the Credit-Anstalt and the German Danatbank had forced the closure of nearly all banks in Austria and Germany. Attempts by Britain to assist the two countries were opposed by France, severely straining cross-Channel relations. On September 13, an abortive coup d’itat in Austria further disturbed the continent, and the overthrow of Western civilization appeared possible.
At home, the National Government, formed on August 25, struggled to pull Britain out of depression while, at the same time, prepare for a general election. These efforts were not, however, received with much enthusiasm, and riots broke out in London and Glasgow on September 10 in response to several economy measures. Pay cuts helped generate a fleet “mutiny” at Invergordon five days later and, on September 21, just three days after the fighting around Mukden erupted, Britain and India went off the gold standard. Several other governments, their currencies now exposed, followed the British lead and the sound of crashing finances drowned out the noise of gunfire from remote Manchuria.
Asian matters were, if anything, in even greater disorder. Political problems in India had reached a stage just short of open rebellion. The recently “unified” government of China was suffering assault from dozens of organized and unorganized rebel groups, and international incidents were a daily occurrence as government forces regularly attacked unarmed foreigners and unprotected foreign property. Anti-Japanese and anti-Korean riots in China provoked anti-Chinese riots in the Japanese colony of Korea. In July, reports surfaced that Captain Nakamura Shintaro, of the Imperial Japanese Army, had been murdered by Chinese troops in Inner Mongolia. Chinese relations with Japan, once very good, had deteriorated to a level best described as one of mutual repugnance.
Japan’s Prime Minister, Hamaguchi Osachi, an advocate of close cooperation with the West and moderation towards China, died on August 26 of wounds suffered in an assassination attempt nine months earlier. Shidehara Kijuro, Japan’s Foreign Minister, remained as the only other Japanese moderate of any prominence, but his once considerable influence over policy and public opinion had declined as conditions in China grew worse. A popular pun of the time held that he had been cut off from the public by the “misty barrier” (Kasumigaseki) surrounding the Foreign Office.9
Taken as a whole, 1931 was a year of chaos, despair, and tragedy. When the situation in Manchuria, after months of development, finally reached its September climax, it became just one of many seemingly insurmountable problems requiring the attention of the major powers.
Prudent Neutrality
British and American representatives were surprised by the outbreak of fighting, but, initially at least, not particularly worried. Sir Miles Lampson, Britain’s minister in Peking, expressed the view that “Japanese troops must have run amuck, ” yet did not stress the point.10 In Japan, W. Cameron Forbes, the U.S. ambassador, sailed for home on September 19 rather than allow his continued presence in Tokyo to exaggerate the importance of the fighting.11 The general mood was perhaps best expressed by Edwin L. Neville, the American Chargé in Japan, when he reported that:12
The [Japanese] military undoubtedly had detailed plans like every army for every contingency they could think of. It seems probable that the incident referred to [bombing of the South Manchurian Railway on September 18] was seized upon by the Army authorities and the whole area occupied as a military measure to force a general liquidation of outstanding issues.
I am inclined to think the Foreign Office and perhaps other branches of the Government here have been genuinely surprised by the action of the army at this time.
Uncertain of the cause, scope, and ultimate direction of the Manchurian conflict, the various Western diplomats submitted similar assessments, collected what information they could, and waited for “developments.”
While this passive role was in accord with Japanese wishes, it was certainly not in accord with those of the Chinese. Unable or unwilling to successfully resist the modest Japanese forces in Manchuria,13 China turned to Britain and the United States and attempted to get them involved in the affair. During the afternoon of September 19, less than eighteen hours after the fighting began, Lampson was asked if Great Britain would support a Chinese appeal to the League of Nations, and perhaps even initiate such an action. Lampson told the Chinese it was “excessively improbable” that Britain would seek such a course.14
Sir Francis Lindley, Britain’s ambassador to Japan, saw in the Chinese appeal a serious threat to British interests, and wrote London:15
In considering Chinese appeal His Majesty’s Government will no doubt give due weight both to the fact that Chinese have followed most exasperating policy in Manchuria where they have … [consistently] attempted to undermine Japanese position which after all rests largely on treaty rights; and to the obvious probability that Japanese action in Manchuria will react favourably on British interests in … [China].
Lindley’s analysis, based on treaty rights and favoring Japan, was completely at odds with that of the U.S. minister in Peking. Nelson T. Johnson, upon receiving a Chinese appeal invoking the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, found the Japanese to be entirely at fault in the matter. The Kellogg Pact outlawed war, Johnson argued, and the Japanese “aggression” in Manchuria was, thus, “accomplished in utter and cynical disregard” of Japan’s obligations under the Pact.16
Though they did not realize it at the time, Lindley and Johnson, through despatches to their respective governments, had uncovered a basic paradox: two sets of treaties, of equal political weight, were involved in the dispute. One set, covering commercial, territorial, and legal rights in China, almost entirely favored Japan. The other set, which detailed the procedures and obligations involved in the pacific settlement of international disputes, almost entirely favored China. Faced with such paradoxes, Britain and the United States continued to play passive parts in the crisis.
For Britain, this was an exceptionally difficult task. The British Empire had traditionally assumed a very active role in the Far East, and Empire ties with Japan and China were far too strong to be governed by neutrality. Six votes in the League of Nations also gave the Empire such a prominent position that ignoring the Chinese appeal could not help but be seen as pro-Japanese, and supporting the appeal, likewise, would be seen as pro-Chinese. In spite of the difficulties, Britain felt compelled to seek a middle ground — a course with much to recommend it, especially since it was felt that Tokyo would soon have control of the situation and action would then be unnecessary.
In order to encourage progress without appearing to take sides, London supported a League resolution of September 22 which called on Japan and China to avoid aggravating the situation. One of the provisions of the resolution also allowed the forwarding to the United States of Council minutes and other information on the crisis. This invited American coordinated action without explicitly making a direct request request for assistance.17 The French delegation at Geneva did, in fact, request the British to ask for American aid,18 but London refused.19 The Foreign Office apparently wished to avoid the impression of dragging the United States into the matter.
Such caution seemed justified when, on September 24, William R. Castle, Jr., the American Assistant Secretary of State, contacted a British representative in Washington and, after declaring that the United States would “whole-heartedly” back the League, went on to urge pursuit of a cautious policy at Geneva. Castle feared that the League might not appreciate the critical nature of the conflict in Tokyo between civilian and mil1tary elements, and stressed that, without an understanding of the “oriental mentality, ” the League could push matters beyond the control of the civilian government.20
This same day, Lindley reported that, from his position in Tokyo, the “active phase” of the crisis seemed to be over.21 He also noted:22
My French colleague who is far from pro-Japanese holds that Chinese have brought this crisis on themselves by their continued evasion in settling legitimate Japanese grievances and above all by their intense anti-Japanese propaganda in Manchuria which threatened the whole Japanese position. He has told his Government that Chinese deserve all they have got and that drastic Japanese action is to the advantage of French and all other foreign interests in China.
On the following day, Lindley added that Japan was united on the Manchurian question, and determined to settle it with the Chinese alone. “In these circumstances,” he warned, “His Majesty’s Government will realise that the League of Nations runs a grave risk of meeting with a most damaging rebuff unless extreme prudence is shown.”23
France and the United States, then, appeared reluctant to force a conclusion to the conflict upon Tokyo, especially in light of the strong feelings then current in Japan. There remained now but one major Far Eastern power to consult: the Soviet Union. Sir William Strang, British representative in Moscow, reported that the Soviets condemned the “manifest imperialism and clear breach of [the] Kellogg Pact,” but were not prepared to act. This analysis was elaborated a few days later when Strang reported that the Soviets felt that the “Chinese from whom they have themselves suffered are being taught another lesson and Japanese who might have been a danger are apparently being constrained by world opinion to act with a certain moderation.”24
No major power, it seemed, was willing to actively support the Chinese appeal or assume an active part in bringing the crisis to a conclusion. The British, furthermore, had been severely embarrassed on September 26 when anti-Japanese riots in Hong Kong resulted in six deaths, and the embarrassment became humiliation when a Japanese warship arrived to insure the protection of Japanese subjects.25 As a result, a strictly neutral resolution, amounting to little more than a rewording of that of September 22, was passed by the League Council on September 30.26
Coordinated Confusion
In October it became clear that the “active phase” of the crisis was far from over. Shidehara had received, shortly after the original bombing incident, a written guarantee from the War Minister, General Minami Jiro, that the conflict would not be escalated. Accordingly, he assured the Western powers of Japan’s peaceful intentions, but Minami proved unable to keep his promise.27 The Gaimusho (Japanese Foreign Office), in turn, was forced to retreat from its policy of conciliation and Shidehara, rather than lose all control over foreign affairs, became an apologist for the army.28
Predictions that Japan would insist upon immediate, direet negotiations with the Chinese, and the Chinese alone, proved to be accurate. Lindley reported that, facing a fill. accompli and an international crisis, the Gaimusho was bound by duty, honor, and public sentiment to support the military. Japan’s vital interests were at stake in Manchuria, and “in the present instance she does not believe that it is as vital for her future to stand well with the League as to defend herself in Manchuria.” Only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Lindley argued, could pressure the Japanese from their new course, and even then such pressure would have to include the threat of war — an unlikely possibility on the part of either Moscow or Washington.29
Japan’s inflexibility was not the only new problem facing Britain. Lord Reading, the British Foreign Secretary, had instructed Lindley not to initiate any “representations” to Japan unless the French did so first, and even then Lindley was to “make it clear” that Britain was merely following the lead of other powers.30a Based upon reports from the French delegation in Geneva, the British concluded that France had, indeed, taken action in Tokyo, and Lindley responded in kind. As it turned out, the French had done nothing of the sort, and Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary, suspected that Britain had been “manoeuvred into isolated action … which could only be interpreted by the Japanese Government as inspired by a less friendly feeling toward them than other countries cherished.” “It looks like a choice,” he continued, “between incompetence or ill faith … I am quite willing to believe in the former; but I am not willing to be ‘led up the path’ like this, and then let down without a word of warning or explanation.” After complaining that the French, as a gesture of “elementary fair play,” should have notified Britain that they intended to “run out,” Vansittart concluded that “the real trouble is that this kind of thing does not make for the confidence that is necessary to collaboration.”30b
Confidence of any sort would have been difficult to develop even without Anglo-French antagonisms. Lampson reported that the Manchurian warlords were willing to negotiate with the Japanese, but that the Nationalists in Nanking would refuse “any communication” until such time as the Kwantung army evacuated the occupied areas. As this position was the absolute antithesis of that of the Japanese, Lord Reading instructed Lampson to “lose no opportunity” in urging the Chinese to abandon any preconditions for negotiations. These instructions were rescinded when Lampson replied that negotiations without prior evacuation would amount to taking the Japanese side, and would bring down the Nanking government.31
In a memorandum on October 12, Sir John Pratt, a Foreign Office specialist in Asian affairs, summed up the problem nicely by observing that “the situation is one which cannot be liquidated. China cannot acquiesce and Japan cannot withdraw.” Pratt expressed his belief that the situation was beyond the League’s power to solve, and solemnly concluded:32
China cannot negotiate until the Japanese troops have withdrawn. To do so would mean complete capitulation, for the sole object of Japanese aggression was to compel China to negotiate. If the Chinese Government capitulate, or if Japanese aggression continues, there is grave danger that all traces of ordered government will disappear throughout China, and the forces of disorder, masquerading under a veneer of communism, will prevail.”
The problem of when to negotiate, and under what conditions, was theoretically the main concern of the Council of the League of Nations when it met in mid-October. An invitation to the United States to participate in Council meetings through an observer sparked a new controversy,33 but this soon passed. Almost immediately, the United States created another distraction when Stimson made it known that, in his opinion, the chief duty of the Council should be an invocation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.34 Britain quickly took care of this matter by invoking the Pact, and requesting other powers to do so.35 After this was accomplished, Stimson seemed to lose interest in the League, and announced that the United States would withdraw its observer.36
Eventually the Council returned to the question of negotiations, and the majority of the member nations came to support the Chinese view. A resolution brought before the Council on October 24 called for an immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces to the South Manchurian Railway Zone, the withdrawal to be completed by November 16, and recommended that, upon completion of this task, Chinese and Japanese representatives meet to negotiate any outstanding issues.37 Japan objected to the principle of withdrawal before negotiations, as well as the deadline, and voted against the resolution, negating its legal validity.38
No further steps were taken by the Council, or by any major power, prior to the November 16 Council meeting. Thus, two months after the crisis began, by far the strongest measure proposed for ending the crisis was the resolution of October 24 which, technically speaking, never progressed beyond the point of “consideration.”
Hiroshima Reconsidered
Japanese control of Manchuria was all but assured by early November. A few outlying strongpoints of Chinese troops remained to be reduced, but by far the largest portion of the area was firmly held by Japanese forces. The disorder and violence which helped precipitate the occupation had been eliminated and, for the first time since the turn of the century, Manchuria appeared reasonably tranquil.
To be sure, eleemosynary interests were not critical factors in the Japanese action. Still, having established a certain degree of military control in the area, it is understandable that the Japanese felt some reluctance to put this order in jeopardy through withdrawal. What little Chinese government existed in the area had been destroyed by the Japanese advance, and there seemed no real alternative to Japanese control.
This situation might have been avoided, and Chinese sovereignty maintained, if strong action had been promoted prior to Japanese consolidation of control. Demanding that Japanese troops withdrawal before negotiations began clearly was not the answer for, as Pratt suggested,39 the Chinese had refused to negotiate before the occupation as well as during the occupation. With this in mind, the Japanese would have been foolish to seriously believe negotiations would take place after withdrawal. The other major possibility — forcing the Chinese to negotiate — was never pursued, but even this tactic may not have guaranteed a reversal as Tokyo seemed unable to effectively control its army.
Shidehara came to believe that either of two policies might ease the crisis: the League could declare itself incapable of contributing to a diplomatic settlement and drop the Chinese appeal, or it could reverse itself and support the Japanese action. Either policy would deny the Chinese outside diplomatic support, and force them to negotiate.40 No power, however, was prepared to endorse one or the other of Shidehara’s alternatives.
Even if a solution had been presented that stood some chance of success, it is doubtful that Britain, the “leader” in the early stages of the crisis, would have been willing to push it to a conclusion. Britain at first hesitated to act because of a lack of information on what had happened. When such information became available, Britain continued to hesitate because of the legal complications involved. British economic and political interests in the Far East, more important than ever in light of the depression and unrest in India, reinforced this hesitation, for action seemed to imply some risk to these interests.
If Britain declined to direct a settlement, no nation was prepared to seize the initiative. The problems of the world seemed entirely too pressing to justify the time, effort, and resources necessary to step in and guide Japan and China back to peace. British attempts to satisfy American desires, particularly before the League, failed to bring Stimson and the United States into leading roles in the affair, and the American Secretary continued to baffle London.41 Cooperation with the French also seemed difficult, not only because the French appeared, at first, to favor the Japanese, but, as Vansittart elaborated, because France tricked Britain into taking isolated action.42
Though the large supply of followers and short supply of leaders, combined with other world distractions, and compounded by the problems concerning scope and form of possible negotiations, all helped prevent a settlement, the single greatest factor was one of time. Quite simply, the participants in the affair had no idea that the Manchurian Incident might be seen as a pattern for future international violence, and, therefore, saw no overriding need for an immediate solution. Auschwitz was, after all, but a small Polish village at this time, and appeasement was an honorable function that every reasonable diplomat was expected to engage in.
Notes
1 For an excellent account of the initial hostilities, see Robert H. Ferrell, “The Mukden Incident: September 18-19, 1931,” Journal of Modern History 27: 66-72 (March 1955). The official League version of the action is still very valuable, and may be found in League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Geneva: The League, October 1, 1932).
2 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1948; reprint ed., Octagon, 1971), p. 221. Cited hereafter as Stimson, Peace and War.
3 For text of the note, see United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States — Japan: 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), I:43. Cited hereafter as FRUS-Japan. See also idem, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 5-6, 159-160. Cited hereafter as Peace and War.
4 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2d ser., vol. IX: The Far Eastern Crisis, 1931-1932, ed. by Rohan Butler, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1965), no. 58:87. Cited hereafter as DBFP IX.
5 Ibid., no. 61:90-91, and no. 66, n. 2:102. For an in-depth review, see Robert H. Hecht, “Great Britain and the Stimson Note of January 7, 1932,” Pacific Historical Review 38: 177-91 (May 1969).
6 Times (London), January 11, 1932, p. 13.
7 Valuable accounts of the League role in the crisis are contained in Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment: An Autobiography by Viscount Cecil (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941); Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, The League, and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1972); and Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935).
America’s participation is explored in A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, copyright 1938); Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957); and Sara R. Smith, The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1932: A Tragedy in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).
Japanese activity was of two types — military and diplomatic — and the military aspect is discussed in Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). Japanese diplomatic activity is reviewed in James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), cited hereafter as Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy; and Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), cited hereafter as Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy.
8 Toynbee’s phrase, from Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1931, ed. by Arnold J. Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 1. This entire volume is devoted to a general overview of the many disasters and near-disasters of 1931.
9 Kasumigaseki was the district in which the Foreign Office was located, and “misty barrier” is a literal translation. See Sidney Devere Brown, “Shidehara Kijuro: The Diplomacy of the Yen,” Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941, ed. by Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1974), p. 221. Cited hereafter as Brown, “Shidehara.”
10 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2d ser., vol. VIII: Chinese Questions, 1929-1931, ed. by Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, and M. E. Lambert (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), no. 506:665. Cited hereafter as DBFP VIII.
11 Gary Ross, “W. Cameron Forbes: The Diplomacy of a Darwinist,” Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1912-1941, ed. by Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1974), p. 63, n. 15.
12 FRUS-Japan I:4. Cf. DBFP VIII, no. 508:667, no. 521:678, and FRUS-Japan
I:2-4.
13 F.F. Liu, a former Nationalist officer, has published a scholarly history of the Nationalist armies and contends that the Japanese attack of September 18 was “made possible by the necessity of Chiang’s keeping Chang Hsuehliang’s Manchurian army within the Great Wall in order to assist in putting down rebellion….” F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 76.
14 DBFP VIII, no. 507:665-66; see also no. 512:670.
15 Ibid., no. 509:667.
16 Peace and War, pp. 4, 155-56.
17 United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), III:36. Cited hereafter as FRUS 1931 III.
18 DBFP VIII, no. 514:672-73.
19 Ibid., no. 515:673.
20 Ibid., no. 524:679-80. Lord Reading, the British Foreign Minister, requested four days later that Castle be thanked and notified of London’s agreement with his views. Ibid., no. 535:687.
21 Ibid., no. 526:681.
22 Ibid., no. 527:681-82.
23 Ibid., no. 531:684-85.
24 Ibid., no. 525:680; no. 533:685-86.
25 Ibid., no. 542, n. 2:692; no. 550:701.
26 FRUS-Japan I:13-14
27 Brown, “Shidehara,” p. 218-19.
28 For a detailed discussion of Japanese intergovernmental tensions, see Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 337-366.
29 DBFP VIII, no. 550:698-702.
30a Ibid., no. 538:688-89.
30b Ibid., no. 563:714-15. Lord Tyrrell, in Paris for League Council business, stated his opinion that the whole episode was a misunderstanding, and that the Japanese might be responsible. Ibid., no. 605:746-47.
31 For this sequence, see ibid., no. 564:715-16; no. 586:733; no. 599:742; and no. 616:752.
32 These and other remarkable comments may be found in ibid., no. 621:756-59.
33 Malcolm D. Kennedy, The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-35 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 180.
34 DBFP VIII, no. 643:776-77; no. 647:781-82.
35 Ibid., no. 649:783-84; no. 651:785-86; no. 654:788; no. 655:789.
36 Ibid., no. 660:793-95.
37 FRUS-Japan I:29-30.
38 FRUS 1931 III:312-13. See also Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy, pp. 359-60.
39 DBFP VIII, no. 621:756-59.
40 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, p. 139.
41 There are several good accounts of Stimson’s participation in the affair. The two most flattering works are Stimson, On Active Service, especially pp. 220-263; and idem., The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New York: Harper, 1936). More critical commentaries include Samuel Flagg Bemis and Robert H. Ferrell, eds., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, vol. XI: Frank B. Kellogg-Henry L. Stimson, by Robert H. Ferrell (New York: Cooper Square, 1963); Elting E. Morison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 368-402; and Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft (n.p.: Archon, 1970, c. 1954).
Armin Rappaport, in Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), offers the best condensation of Stimson’s diplomacy in his seven chapter titles, which read, respectively:
“In which the world reacts”;
“In which Stimson remains calm and refuses to press Japan”;
“In which Japan ignores the League of Nations and the world”;
“In which Stimson loses patience and proclaims nonrecognition”;
“In which Stimson becomes angry and warns Japan”;
“In which Stimson becomes exasperated and threatens Japan”;
“In which Stimson leaves office frustrated.”
42 DBFP VIII, no. 563:714-15.
43 Viscount Cecil, British representative to the League of Nations, claimed on December 8, 1931, that the Manchurian conflict endangered France by setting an example for the violent disregard of treaties such as the Versailles settlement, but his claim seems to be a deliberate exaggeration of his true feelings. See ibid, no. 831:1000-01.
Selected Bibliography
Documents
Great Britain. Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Second series. Vol. VIII: Chinese Questions, 1929-1931. Ed. by Rohan Butler, J.P.T. Bury, and M.E. Lambert. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960.
Great Britain. Foreign Office. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Second series. Vol. IX: The Far Eastern Crisis, 1931-1932. Ed. by Rohan Butler, Douglas Dakin, and M.E. Lambert. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1965.
Note that only the second of the two volumes listed above is titled “The Far Eastern Crisis.” The first volume covers the initial crisis, and is therefore a “Chinese question, ” whereas the second volume covers the Shanghai Incident, and thus becomes a “crisis.”
League of Nations. Appeal by the Chinese Government. Report of the Commission of Enquiry. Geneva: The League, October 1, 1932. LN doc .no. C.663.M.320.1932.VIII.
United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931. Vol. III. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1946.
United States. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan: 1931-1941. Vol. I. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1943.
United States. Department of State. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1943.
Monographs
Burns, Richard Dean, and Bennett, Edward M., eds. Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1974.
Collection of original sketches of leading diplomats, utilizing new sources. Sketches of Nelson T. Johnson, Stanley K. Hornbeck, W. Cameron Forbes, and Baron Shidehara Kijuro are particularly useful in examining the Manchurian Incident. Hornbeck, for example, after reviewing certain legal problems involved in the conflict, wrote that “almost no Oriental considers that he is under any obligation, either moral or legal, in relation to a pledge which he made under duress — and his definition of duress is widely comprehensive.”
Crowley, James B. Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966.
First major reappraisal, in English, of the Japanese side of pre-war diplomacy since Dr. Takeuchi’s study in 1935 (see below). A controversial work in some respects, Crowley believes that the Gaimusho retained more control over foreign affairs after the Manchurian Incident than most scholars are willing to admit.
Ferrell, Robert H. American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933. New York: W.W. Norton, 1970, c. 1957.
Easy to read yet detailed study of topic. Ferrell finds Stimson to be a tragi-comic figure: Henry was very funny, but it sure was a tragedy he was in office. Comments on Charles G. Dawes’ trip to Paris in November, 1931, are in a similar vein.
Rappaport, Armin. Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-33. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
Very little on British reactions to Stimson, due to limited amount of published documents at time of printing. Treatment of Japanese reactions, on the other hand, is exceptionally good. Possibly the best book on Stimson, in spite of narrow topic, because of manageable length and clear, comfortable writing style.
Takeuchi Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935.
Without question the most authoritative work on the theory and practice of Japanese foreign policy up to 1935. Administrative structure of Gaimusho, and its relation and relative status to other organs of government, is well presented. Very little interpretation but much documentation on the Manchurian Incident.
Thorne, Christopher. The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League, and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933. New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1972.
Thorne loves to quote, document, and otherwise avoid saying anything original. This penchant makes his book almost impossible to read, but it also makes it easy to review almost everything on the subject without bothering to go beyond this one work. Almost every aspect of the Manchurian Incident is covered in detail, leaving future authors the awesome task of making this period readable.
Zonkemall, General John W. The Manchurian Crisis: A Study in Seminar Due Dates and Poisonous Spiritmasters. Pullman, Wash.: Tardy Press, late 1976.
Zonkemall has once again displayed his mastery of lower-case typewriter keys. His study, the product of two months of research and nine years of writing, will stand as an awesome tribute to all students crushed by brutal acts of fate and buried under heaps of embarrassment.